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The European Union and the International Criminal 
Court: an awkward symbiosis in interesting times  
 
ANTONIS ANTONIADIS* & OLYMPIA BEKOU** 
 
Abstract 
 
The aim of this article is to provide an overview and evaluation of the EU-ICC 
partnership. The analysis includes the measures the EU has taken to commit to the 
ICC cause and implement the Rome Statute and their impact on EU policy-making. 
These measures include the EU-ICC Cooperation Agreement as well as EU Third 
Pillar rules affecting Member States cooperation with the ICC and governing the 
investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC. The issue 
of judicial protection and respect of fundamental rights in the EU under the Third 
Pillar will also be addressed. Finally, the analysis of EU initiatives, primarily in its 
relations with third countries, to preserve the universality and integrity of the Rome 
Statute will follow.  
 
Introduction 
 
 The International Criminal Court (ICC) occupies a central position in the 
establishment of a system of international criminal justice on a global scale. Owing to 
its wide-ranging objectives and potentially universal reach, the ICC’s creation is 
regarded as the greatest development in international law over the past decade.1 The 
European Union (EU) has been at the forefront of the efforts for the Court’s 
establishment, development and operation. Beyond the grand rhetoric surrounding the 
EU-ICC relations, the EU has undoubtedly committed substantial diplomatic capital 
and resources to the ICC cause. Parallel to the developments at the ICC, the Union 
finds itself at an important crossroad in its constitutional development.2 Over the 
years, its constitutional transformation has, to a large degree, enabled it to assume its 
responsibility as an active player in a rapidly changing world and in the face of ever-
greater challenges.3  
 With regard to the ICC, however, the EU’s protagonistic role is inherently 
controversial because of its constitutional features. The political capital invested in the 
success of the ICC may run the risk of being wasted as a result of the inability of the 
Union to support the good intentions with tangible policies and measures. This is 
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1 For an overview of the International Criminal Court (ICC), see William A Schabas, An Introduction to 
the International Criminal Court, 2nd edition, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004). 
2 See, Brussels European Council 21/22 June 2007, Presidency Conclusions, Doc. 11177/07 CONCL2, 
embarking on yet another Treaty reform. 
3 Presidency Conclusions at paragraph 2. For the development of the EU institutional framework in 
areas falling within the ambit of the ICC, see Steve Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, 2nd 
edition, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006), Chapter 2. 
because the EU operates alongside a growing number of Member States, and is totally 
dependent upon their criminal justice systems, as well as national police forces, 
prosecutors and courts that the EU does not itself possess. In recent years, common 
rules have been promulgated by the EU in the field of Police and Judicial Cooperation 
leading to the emergence of an EU criminal law body,4 which is becoming 
increasingly significant in relation to ICC matters.  
 The aim of this article is to provide an overview of the EU-ICC partnership. 
To do so, this article aims to examine the EU initiatives in relation to the ICC and 
analyse them against the backdrop of the EU’s constitutional peculiarities. The 
analysis includes the measures the EU has taken to commit to the ICC cause and 
implement the Rome Statute and their impact on EU policy-making. More 
specifically, this article will analyse the EU-ICC Cooperation Agreement and the EU 
Third Pillar measures affecting Member States cooperation with the ICC and 
governing the investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
ICC. A brief comment on the judicial review of Third Pillar measures in the European 
Union will follow. Further, focus will shift to the examination of EU initiatives, 
primarily in its relations with third countries, to preserve the universality and integrity 
of the Rome Statute. Finally, this article will identify some challenges this awkward 
symbiosis between the Union and the ICC is likely to face.  
 
The European Union and the ICC 
 
 The Statute for the ICC was adopted on 17 July 1998 at the end of The Rome 
Conference which was, in many respects unique.5 Spread over six weeks, never 
before had so many States and NGOs taken part in a multilateral conference on 
international law.6 Following the successful outcome of the negotiations,7 the Court 
became operational on 1 July 2002 and, to date, numbers 105 State parties to it.8 
Earlier this year, the Court’s first trial, that of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, began in the 
Hague and the charges against him were confirmed on 29 January 2007.9 As a global 
institution, which, however, operates outside the UN system, the ICC benefits from 
the support of States and other international institutions. In order to sustain its 
potentially universal ambit in the fight against impunity, the Court relies heavily on 
the above not only to promote its cause, but also to perform its daily functions. 
                                                 
 
4 Ibid. at Chapter 8. 
5 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) (17 July 1998) 2187 United Nations 
Treaty Series 3; 37 International Legal Materials 999. 
6 Philippe Kirsch and John T. Holmes, “The Birth of the International Criminal Court: The 1998 Rome 
Conference” (1998) 36 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 3. 
7 Philippe Kirsch and John T. Holmes, “The Rome Conference on an International criminal Court: The 
Negotiating Process, (1999) 93 American Journal of International Law 2. 
8 The Rome Statute came into force on 1 July 2002, 60 days after the 60th ratification, which took place 
on 11 April 2002. See Article 126 Rome Statute. Japan is the latest to join the ICC regime on the 17 
July 2007. Information about state ratifications to the Rome Statute is available at 
<http://www.iccnow.org/documents/RATIFICATIONSbyRegion.pdf>    
9 Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the Case of the Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Pre-Trial Chamber I (ICC-01/04-01/06). Matthew 
Happold, “Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga, Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International 
Criminal Court, 29 January 2007” (2007) 56 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 713; 
Gauthier De Beco, “The Confirmation of Charges before the International Criminal Court: Evaluation 
and First Application” (2007) 7 International Criminal Law Review 469. 
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 Being an international organisation the ICC membership consists of states. 
However, some role is also envisaged for intergovernmental organisations, but this is 
limited to issues of cooperation.10 The EU is not a State and as such not a party to the 
Rome Statute. However, the EU developed as one of the staunchest supporters of the 
ICC,11 not only in terms of its overall policy, but also in terms of generous financial 
support provided to the Court.12 The EU advocated the importance of putting an end 
to the impunity of perpetrators of the most heinous international crimes since the first 
steps towards the establishment of the Court.13 Since the entry into force of the Rome 
Statute, the EU has taken a series of measures to continue its support and reinforce the 
ICC. The importance the EU has given to the Court can be explained both with 
reference to the EU’s own values and objectives, but also its strategic priorities. 
 Anyone with a vague understanding of the European integration process will 
identify the reasons behind the EU’s interest in the ICC which goes beyond the easily 
identifiable events that led to the establishment of the European Communities in the 
1950s.14 Yet, nowhere in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) is inscribed a value 
and objective broad enough to fully and explicitly encapsulate the objectives laid 
down in the Rome Statute. This has been usually accommodated in “the consolidation 
of the rule of law and respect for human rights” eulogies of the TEU.15 It has been 
assumed all along that “the principles of the Rome Statute … are fully in line with the 
principles and objectives of the Union”.16 Regarding the strategic priorities of the 
Union, apart from the general objective enshrined in the TEU that the Union asserts 
its identity on the international scene,17 the promotion of the ICC is identified as a 
priority in the EU’s commitment to the establishment of an international order based 
on effective multilateralism.18  
 
The European Union as the ICC’s partner 
 
                                                 
 
10 Article 87(6) Rome Statute. 
11 Cedric Ryngaert, “Universal Jurisdiction in an ICC Era: A Role to Play for EU Member States with 
the Support of the European Union” (2006) 14 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and 
Criminal Justice 46. 
12 The EU, through a dedicated budget line created by the European Parliament has provided over EUR 
20 million under the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) for projects 
supporting the ICC and international criminal justice. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/human_rights/icc/index.htm.  
13 Statement by the Spanish Presidency in the Sixth Committee in the 50th UN General Assembly on 
the establishment of an International Criminal Court, 30 May 1995, New York available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ICC2EN.pdf. The substantive input of the EU in 
the drafting of the Rome Statute must be presumed. In fact, most of the issues raised by the Spanish 
Presidency in its Statement have been addressed in an EU-desirable manner in the final text. 
14 This is not limited to the coincidence that the foundational Treaties of both the European Economic 
Community and the ICC were signed in Rome. 
15 Article 11 TEU. See also, Recital 1 of the Common Position. 
16 Recital 3 of Council Common Position 2001/443/CFSP of 11 June 2001 on the International 
Criminal Court, O.J. L 155/19, 12.6.2001. 
17 Article 2, second indent TEU. 
18 European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/2004/4/29/European%20Security%20Strategy.
pdf; See, Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the European Union on cooperation 
and assistance, O.J. L115/50, 28.4.2006, Recital 5.  
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 In developing a partnership with the ICC, the EU has taken a number of 
initiatives which will be examined in detail below. To understand where these fit with 
the EU legal order, a succinct introduction to the EU edifice is needed. A lot of ink 
has been spilled in law and political science literature to analyse the EU constitutional 
idiosyncrasy.19 For our purposes, it is important to highlight that the EU is not a 
unitary international actor but, by contrast, it consists of a complex mesh of Treaties 
which establish different methods and rules depending on whether the EU is acting in 
the field of agriculture, monitoring missions abroad or measures taken to combat 
organised crime.20 This peculiar constitutional structure has been graphically 
represented in the form of three pillars of an ancient Greek temple, the First Pillar 
incorporating EU action in fields of European Community competence, the Second 
Pillar covering the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Third Pillar 
the Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal matters.21 The remainder of 
competences remain with the Member States.  
 How is the EU supposed to operate on the international plane when there are 
overlaps between Community (First Pillar), Union (Second and Third Pillars) and 
Member States’ competences? Traditional EU external relations theory and practice 
has dealt with the problem by having recourse to the principle of mixity, a term 
invented to describe the European Community and Member State joint participation in 
the negotiation, conclusion and implementation of international agreements.22 Since 
the entry into force of the TEU and the subsequent practice of concluding agreements 
under the Second and Third Pillars, the problem has been exacerbated. All hope has 
been trusted in constitutional reform which would abolish the Pillar structure and 
provide for a more workable pattern of international action.23 At present however, the 
EU constitutional construction necessitates measures taken under different Treaty 
regimes as well as by the Member States for the fulfilment of the Rome Statute 
obligations. 
 Having already portended the multidimensional character of EU policy 
towards the ICC, it should be explained that the different Treaty objectives, 
instruments and methods applicable in the different Pillars raise both theoretical and 
practical considerations. Moving from the domain of theoretical abstraction to the real 
problems in policy-making and policy-implementing, the main foundation of the 
                                                 
 
19 Inter alia, Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe: “Do the New Clothes Have an 
Emperor?”, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999); Deirdre Curtin, “The Constitutional 
Structure of the Union: A Europe of Bits and Pieces” (1993) 30 Common Market Law Review 17; 
Walter van Gerven, The European Union: A Polity of States and Peoples, (Hart Publishing, Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon, 2005) 
20 A more pragmatic view would indicate that the Union is a unitary organisation. See, Deirdre Curtin 
and Ige Dekker, “The EU as a ‘Layered’ International Organization: Institutional Unity in Disguise” in 
Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca, The Evolution of EU Law, (OUP, 1999), pp. 83-132. 
21 Anthony Arnull, Alan Dashwood, Michael Dougan, Malcolm Ross, Eleanor Spaventa and Derrick 
Wyatt, Wyatt & Dashwood’s European Union Law, (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2006), at p. 18.  
22 See inter alia, Joni Heliskoski, Mixed Agreements as a Technique for Organizing the International 
Relations of the European Community and its Member States, (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 
London, NewYork, 2001); Joseph H.H. Weiler, “The external legal relations of non-unitary actors: 
mixity and the federal principle” in Joseph H.H. Weiler, supra note 19 at pp. 130-187; Panos 
Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law, (Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2006), 
Chapter 4.  
23 The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe provided a qualified solution to the problems by 
proposing the abolition of the Pillar structure. However, the Treaty failed ratification by all Member 
States and has been consequently abandoned. A Reform Treaty based on the failed Constitution’s 
blueprint has been proposed and negotiations are ongoing. Supra note 2. 
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relationship between the EU and the ICC is the Common Position on the International 
Criminal Court.24 At the same time, the main instrument implementing the 
cooperation obligation of the Rome Statute on behalf of the EU is the EU-ICC 
Agreement.25 Both instruments have been adopted under the CFSP. However, 
measures relating to the implementation of most other Rome Statute obligations to 
which the Union has committed itself by virtue of the Common Position have been 
adopted under the Third Pillar.26 Finally, as will be seen below, the promotion, of the 
principles of international criminal law in third countries has taken place pursuant to 
First Pillar instruments, through international agreements concluded by the 
Community.27 Clearly, however, most ICC-related obligations will have to be carried 
out by the Member States acting in their own competences.  
 This short introduction already demonstrates the Pillar-straddling activities of 
the EU with regard to the ICC are destined to challenge the EU in particular regarding 
the effective implementation of the ICC-sponsored obligations.  
The EU’s commitment vis-à-vis the ICC 
 
 In order to put its intentions into action, the EU needs and to take those 
measures necessary to implement the ICC obligations. At the outset, it should be 
recalled that the EU is not a party to the Rome Statute and, as such, it is not bound by 
it in international law. From an EU perspective, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
promulgated the doctrine of functional succession which can be summarised in the 
proposition that the EU is bound by an international treaty to which it is not a party 
when the EU has taken over the responsibility from the Member States, i.e. having 
acquired exclusive competence, with regard to the agreement’s functions.28 It goes 
without saying that for such functional succession to take place all Member States 
must be parties to a given international agreement.29 This is not the case with the 
Rome Statute.30 
                                                 
 
24 Council Common Position 2003/444/CFSP of 16 June 2003 on the International Criminal Court, O.J. 
L 150/67, 18.6.2003. Hereafter the ‘Common Position’. For an analysis of its previsions see infra. 
25 Council Decision 2006/313/CFSP of 10 April 2006 concerning the conclusion of the Agreement 
between the International Criminal Court and the European Union on cooperation and assistance, O.J. 
L 115/49, 28.4.2006. Hereafter, ‘EU-ICC Agreement’. 
26 Decision 2002/494/JHA of 13 June 2002 setting up a European network of contact points in respect 
of persons responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, O.J. L 167/1, 26.6.2002; 
Decision 2003/335/JHA of 8 May 2003 concerning the investigation and prosecution of genocide, 
crimes against humanity and was crimes, O.J. L 118/12, 14.5.2003; Framework Decision 2002/584 of 
13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between the Member States, 
O.J. L190/1, 18.7.2002. 
27 For instance, the Revised Cotonou Agreement. 
28 Cases 21-24/72 International Fruit Company NV v. Produktschaap voor Groenten en Fruit [1972] 
ECR 1219 at paragraphs 14-19 with regard to the GATT.  
29 Robert Schütze, “On ‘Middle Ground’: The European Community and Public International Law”, 
EUI Working Papers, LAW 2007/13, at p. 12. 
30 It has been argued in theory that the doctrine of functional succession could be translated from the 
GATT to other international settings in particular the United Nations. See, Piet Eeckhout, External 
Relations of the European Union: Legal and Constitutional Foundations, (Oxford University Press, 
2004), at p. 439. This suggestion has been controversially followed in the recent judicial 
pronouncements by the European Court of First Instance in Cases T-306/01 Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al 
Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission [2005] ECR II-3533 and T-315/01 
Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council and Commission [2005] ECR II-3649. 
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 The EU committed itself to the fight against impunity by virtue of a Common 
Position31 which establishes the basic framework governing the EU-ICC relations. 
The first Common Position on the International Criminal Court was adopted by the 
Council in 2001.32 In accordance with the theory of EU external relations, Common 
Positions establish the Union’s policy statement on a certain theme.33 The timing of 
its adoption affected its focus which concentrated on the early entry into force of the 
Rome Statute and the establishment of the ICC.34 To this end, the EU assumed the 
obligation to contribute by raising the issue in its relations with third parties and by 
assisting with implementation.35 The Common Position was amended in 200236 and 
reached its current form in 2003.37  
 The 2003 Common Position, which is largely based on the 2001 blueprint, 
endorses the principles and rules of international criminal law of the Rome Statute and 
identifies the priorities and areas in which the European Union and the Member States 
must act. In this respect, priority is given to the universal accession to the Rome 
Statute,38 the implementation of the Rome Statute by measures taken by the European 
Union and the Member States,39 as well as the preservation of the integrity of the 
Rome Statute.40  
 Measures to achieve the target of universal accession are further elaborated. 
The European Union and the Member States undertake to raise the issue of 
ratification, acceptance, approval and accession in negotiations with third States, 
groups of States or relevant regional organisations.41 They also undertake to provide 
technical and financial assistance.42 The provision of political and technical support 
may be part of country or region-specific strategies.43 In addition to the mention of the 
Action Plan in the preamble, little else is set out with regard to implementation. The 
Council of the European Union is simply given the task to coordinate the measures by 
the European Union and the Member States but only in so far as implementation of 
Articles 2 and 3 of the Common Position.44 It should be pointed out that, in a way, 
implementation by the EU and the Member States is not highlighted in the Common 
Position; the emphasis is on providing assistance to third States. Regarding the 
integrity of the Rome Statute, the Common Position draws attention to the EU 
Guiding Principles enshrined in the Council Conclusions of 30 September 2002.45 
Finally, the Common Position establishes an obligation on the Member States to 
cooperate to ensure the smooth functioning of the Assembly of States Parties (ASP).46 
                                                 
 
31 Supra note 24 
32 Supra note 16. 
33 Article 15 TEU. Eeckhout, supra note 30, at p. 404. 
34 Article 1(2) of the 2001 Common Position. 
35 Article 2 of the 2001 Common Position. 
36 See 2002/474/CFSP O.J. L 164/1, 22.6.2002. 
37 Council Common Position 2003/444/CFSP of 16 June 2003 on the International Criminal Court, O.J. 
L 150/67, 18.6.2003. 
38 Ibid, Recital 7. 
39 Ibid, Recital 8. 
40 Ibid, Recital 10. 
41 Ibid, Article 2(1). 
42 Ibid, Article 2(3). 
43 Ibid, Article 2(4). 
44 Ibid, Article 4. 
45 Ibid, Article 5. 
46 Ibid, Article 7. 
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 A critical reading of the Common Position reveals that it is formulated in 
general terms, as Common Positions are supposed to be, and leaves many gaps to be 
covered by either atypical instruments (Action Plan, EU Guiding Principles) or by 
further initiatives in international fora, either in the form of unilateral technical 
assistance to third States to deal with implementation issues or by establishing the 
ICC as part of the common vocabulary in relations with third States and international 
organisations. However, the absence of any detail regarding measures to be taken at 
an EU level to implement the Rome Statute is striking. The extent to which the 
European Union has fulfilled the general mandate provided by the Common Position 
will be examined further below. 
   The Common Position provisions are supplemented and further elaborated 
upon in the Action Plan to follow-up on the Common Position on the International 
Criminal Court, adopted in 2002 and amended in 2004.47 The Action Plan is divided 
into three sections: A. Coordination of EU activities, B. Universality and integrity of 
the Rome Statute and C. Independence and effective functioning of the ICC.48 Section 
A maintains an institutional focus and establishes the steps which must be taken to 
bring the ICC squarely within the EU agenda and ensure better flow of information on 
ICC-related matters among the EU institutions. The most important element 
informing the effective co-ordination and consistency of information is the 
establishment of an EU Focal Point and corresponding national Focal Points.49 
Section B establishes the means to achieve the universality objective which include 
political dialogue, demarches or other bilateral means, statements in the UN and other 
multilateral bodies and support for the dissemination of the ICC principles and rules.50 
Country or region-specific strategies will be developed to coordinate political and 
technical support.51 Concrete measures include, among others, the mainstreaming of 
the ICC in EU external relations52 and the provision of financial and technical 
assistance to third countries53 including the establishment of a list of experts 
maintained at the EU Focal Point.54 A single paragraph is dedicated to the integrity of 
the Rome Statute and provides for the application mutatis mutandis of Sections A and 
B of the Action Plan.55 The independence and effective functioning of the ICC will be 
achieved by measures such as the transparent selection, nomination, election and 
subsequent training of the ICC judges, prosecutors and staff56 and the prompt transfer 
of contributions to the ICC.57 In addition, Member States are encouraged to contribute 
to the Special Working Group on the crime of aggression,58 to put in place legislation 
necessary to implement the Rome Statute59 including the Agreement on Privileges and 
                                                 
 
47 Doc 5742/04 LIMITE, Action Plan to follow-up on the Common Position on the International 
Criminal Court, Brussels, 28 January 2004. Herafter, ‘Action Plan’. 
48 Preamble to the Action Plan. 
49 Section A.1.2-3 of the Action Plan. The detailed mandate of the EU Focal Point can be found in the 
Annex to the Action Plan. 
50 Ibid, Section B.1(ii). 
51 Ibid, Section B.2(i). 
52 Ibid, Sections B.3(iii)-(viii). 
53 Ibid, Sections B.3(ix)-(xi). 
54 Ibid, Section B.3(xii). 
55 Ibid, Section B.3(xiii). 
56 Ibid, Sections C.2(i), (iv). 
57 Ibid, Section C.2(iii). 
58 Ibid, Section C.2(vii). 
59 Ibid, Section C.2(viii). 
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Immunities of the ICC,60 to cooperate with the ICC in the investigation and 
prosecution of crimes within its jurisdiction, in particular through the provision of 
judicial assistance, compliance with requests for arrest and surrender and the 
enforcement of sentences61 and promote effective cooperation between national and 
European law enforcement and immigration authorities and the ICC.62  
 Overall, the Action Plan is an amalgam of aspirational rhetoric and down-to-
earth practical measures. It has become highly influential in EU policy-making while 
the success of achieving the objectives set has been mixed. Together with the 
Common Position, the Action Plan provides the framework of all direct EU action on 
the ICC and lay the foundations of the relationship between the Union, the Court and 
individual Member States.  
 
Implementing the Rome Statute 
 
 The section that follows concerns the implementation of the ICC obligations 
by the EU. Following some introductory remarks, this part will examine the measures 
taken by the EU in order to implement the cooperation obligations stemming from the 
Rome Statute. In addition, legislation adopted in the field of Police and Judicial 
Cooperation in Criminal Matters on an EU level, which albeit not ICC-specific is of 
immediate relevance to the ICC, will be examined. Such legislation raises issues of 
judicial protection and respect for fundamental rights in the European Union which 
will be addressed, prior to analysing the measures taken in order to achieve the 
universality and integrity of the Rome Statute. The final issue to be examined is that 
of EU Member State coordination in the ASP.  
 The Rome Statute cannot operate independently of State action. The 
incorporation into domestic law of certain Statute provisions is necessary for its 
procedures to gain meaning and effectiveness nationally. Implementation falls within 
the competence of individual Member States. To assess the reaction of the EU on the 
issue, an overview of some fundamental questions as to why, when and how a State 
must engage in the process is necessary. Not all of the Rome Statute provisions need 
to be implemented. This obligation is limited to the cooperation part of the ICC 
Statute63 and does not extend to the substantive criminal law provisions, whose 
implementation remains at the discretion of the State concerned.64  
 Despite the merits of enacting national legislation, States have generally not 
taken up the implementation challenge.65 To do it properly, implementation requires 
expert knowledge and adequate resources. The Rome Statute is a highly complex 
                                                 
 
60 Ibid, Section C.2(x). 
61 Ibid, Section C.2(ix). 
62 Ibid, Section C.2(xi). 
63 Article 88 Rome Statute states: “States Parties … shall ensure that there are procedures available 
under their national law for all of the forms of co-operation which are specified under this Part.” 
64 Fourth and sixth preambular paragraphs of the Rome Statute. Neither the preamble nor the reference 
therein are binding. Furthermore, the argument that the relevant preambular paragraphs codify existing 
customary law which obliges implementation is no more convincing. For this argument, see Jann K 
Kleffner, “The Impact of Complementarity on National Implementation of Substantive International 
Criminal Law” (2003) 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice 86 at pp. 90-94. 
65 Of the 105 State parties to date, only approximately one third have enacted ICC implementing 
legislation. For a complete catalogue of all available implementing legislation see: 
http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/law/hrlc/international-criminal-justice-unit/implementation-database.php  
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legal instrument which requires good understanding of international criminal law of 
the national drafters. Undoubtedly, implementation takes time.66 The Rome Statute 
does not specify when implementation ought to take place. States are at liberty to 
decide whether to implement before or after ratification. Since the ICC became 
operational in July 2002, however, State parties may be required to execute an ICC 
cooperation request which requires available procedures nationally. In practice, most 
States become parties to the Rome Statute first and implement its terms afterwards.67  
 A State’s ability to implement may be affected by certain provisions found in 
its constitution as well as the legal system that the State in question follows. 
Provisions in the Rome Statute may conflict with various constitutional guarantees68 
the resolution of which may lead to delays in implementation and may prove 
problematic in practice, particularly regarding the execution of an ICC cooperation 
request. The European Commission for Democracy (Venice Commission) of the 
Council of Europe has identified the following areas as potentially conflicting with 
the ICC regime:69 
“[The] immunity of persons having an official capacity; the obligation for states to surrender 
their own nationals to the court at its request; the possibility for the court to impose a term of 
life imprisonment; exercise of the prerogative of pardon; execution of requests made by the 
court’s Prosecutor, amnesties decreed under national law or the existence of a national statute 
of limitation; and the fact that persons brought before the court will be tried by a panel of 
three judges rather than a jury.” 
 A State facing constitutional incompatibilities essentially has two options: It 
may either amend the conflicting constitutional provisions or interpret them in such a 
way so as to allow for the application of the ICC regime.70 Other delays may ensue 
owing to the model a State follows regarding the incorporation of international law 
within its domestic legal system.71 States that follow the dualist tradition require 
                                                 
 
66 Even when the political will is present, the drafting of legislation and its subsequent approval by the 
relevant body, usually the national Parliament, take a substantial amount of time. 
67 The United Kingdom is a good example of a state which implemented first and ratified later. The 
International Criminal Court Act 2001 (UK) was passed on 24 September 2001 and entered into force 
on 17 December 2001. The United Kingdom's instrument of ratification was deposited on 4 October 
2001, once the Act had been passed. 
68 See, for example, Helen Duffy, “National Constitutional Compatibility and the International Criminal 
Court” (2001) 11 Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 5; Darryl Robinson, “The Rome 
Statute and its Impact on National Law” in Antonio Cassese, Paolo Gaeta and John RWD Jones (eds), 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, vol II, (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2002), p. 1849; Venice Commission of the Council of Europe (Venice Commission) 
“Report on Constitutional Issues Raised by the Ratification of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court Adopted by the Commission at its 45th Plenary Meeting (Venice, 15-16 
December2000)” (15 January 2001) CCDL-INF (2001) 1. 
69 Ibid. [footnotes omitted]. 
70 For example, in France, the Head of State cannot be prosecuted before the national courts.  
Therefore, an amendment was made to Article 53-2 of the French Constitution of 1958 to recognise the 
jurisdiction of the ICC so that any proceedings against the Head of State can take place before the ICC.  
See Antoine Buchet, “L’intégration en France de la Convention portant statut de la Cour pénale 
internationale: histoire brève et inachevée d'une mutation attendee” in Claus Kreβ and Flavia Lattanzi 
(eds.), The Rome Statute and Domestic Legal Orders; General Aspects and Constitutional Issues, vol 1, 
(Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 2000), p. 65. 
71 For a more detailed and sophisticated analysis, see Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International 
Law, 6th edition, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003), at pp. 31-33; L Ferrari-Bravo, 
“International and Municipal Law: The Complementarity of Legal Systems” in R StJ MacDonald and 
D M Johnston (eds), The Structure and Process of International Law: Essays in Legal Philosophy, 
Doctrine and Theory, (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1983), p. 715; Joseph G Starke, “Monism and 
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incorporating legislation to give effect to an international treaty at the domestic level. 
States following the monist legal tradition may – mistakenly perhaps – assume that 
there is no need to provide for implementing legislation.72 Whichever the case,73 it is 
in any case important to emphasise that even if the crimes provisions of the Rome 
Statute could be directly relied upon in the domestic legal order, the cooperation 
regime would need further implementation. A state needs to specify in its legislation 
which is the competent authority, among others, to receive the cooperation request or 
to arrest the suspect and transfer them to the ICC.74 Hence, the existence of legislation 
in place is necessary; and this is independent of the legal system followed and 
common to both monist and dualist traditions. 
 Taking into account the above need for enactment of ICC implementing 
legislation, the EU Member States have been distinguished for the rate of 
implementation of the ICC obligations. In fact, the majority of the States which have 
passed legislation are EU Member States.75 This reveals a possible connection 
between the higher implementation rate and membership of the EU. It may indirectly 
be attributed to the enhanced interest which the active involvement of many EU 
Member States in the drafting of the Rome Statute may have generated, peer pressure 
and the active promotion of the ICC by the EU.76 Despite the success in general 
terms, EU Member State implementation cannot be perceived to match the rhetoric of 
the Union’s Common Position. Plenty of European States, particularly from the so-
called “New Europe”, have not yet enacted legislation, following thus the global 
end.77  
                                                                                                                                           
tr
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dualism in the Theory of International Law” (1936) 17 British Yearbook of International Law 66; 
Felice Morgenstern, “Judicial Practice and the Supremacy of International Law” (1950) 27 British 
Yearbook of International Law 42. 
72 The monist tradition dictates that when a state ratifies an international agreement, the self-executing 
provisions of that treaty apply directly in domestic law and prevail over conflicting domestic 
provisions.  See Eileen Denza, “The Relationship between International Law and National Law” in 
Malcolm D Evans, International Law, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003), p. 415, at p. 421. 
73 See Denza, ibid, pp. 422-428, who examines the approach taken by six different countries and 
identifies the absence of “pure” monist or dualist States.  See also Francis G Jacobs and Shelley 
Roberts (eds,), The Effect of Treaties in Domestic Law, (Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1987); Ignaz 
Seidl-Hohenveldern, “Transformation or Adoption of International Law into Municipal Law” (1963) 12 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 88. 
74 Articles 86, 87(1) and 89 Rome Statute. 
75 See generally Nicolaos Strapatsas, “The European Union and its Contribution to the Development of 
the International Criminal Court” (2003) 33 Revue de Droit de l’ Université de Sherbrooke 399. 
76 See Article 9(2) Common Position. By virtue of this provision, the Common Position applies to 
Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey. See also the pressure put on Serbia with regard to its international 
criminal law obligations and the impact non-compliance with these might have on its future accession. 
See European Commission “EU-Serbia relations” (2006), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/serbia/eu_serbia_and_montenegro_relations_en.htm  See also Nevena 
Simidjiyska, “From Milosevic’s Reign to the European Union: Serbia and Montenegro’s Stabilization 
and Association Agreement” (2007) 21 Temple International and Comparative Law Journal 147. 
77 Greece, Lithuania and Cyprus have been conspicuously absent from the implementation debate. 
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 EU Cooperation: The EU-ICC Cooperation Agreement   
 
 International criminal justice institutions with no suspects in custody and no 
evidence at their disposal could hardly claim to be effective. The Court does not 
possess an international police force of its own, and relies on States to perform all 
cooperation tasks.78 Cooperation with the ICC is both a Member State and an EU 
matter. EU Member States that are Parties to the ICC Statute are under an obligation 
to execute a cooperation request made by the Court.79 Moreover, cooperation of 
intergovernmental organisations, such as the EU, is important for the ICC to 
adequately perform its functions. Recognition of the significance of the role that 
international organisations may play in post-conflict situations or situations where 
serious disturbances have occurred, in which the ICC operates as well as the 
assistance such organisations may provide to the Court, led to the inclusion of Article 
87(6) Rome Statute, which enables the ICC to request assistance from 
intergovernmental organisations.80 The emphasis of this Article on the provision of 
information or documents may be explained in that this would be the most common 
form of assistance these organisations would be able to provide the Court with. Other 
forms of cooperation, including, arguably, requests for arrest and surrender, are not 
al Member States have with the Court. In fact, it is made explicit 
                                                
precluded in Article 87(6) but should be seen in light of the organisation’s constituent 
instrument and certainly “in accordance with its competence or mandate”.81 
 An international agreement which defines the terms of cooperation and 
assistance between the EU and the Court has been concluded.82 The origin of the 
Agreement can be found in a request made by the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of 
the ICC to the EU regarding strategic information from the EU on issues of concern to 
the OTP’s investigations.83 The Agreement which was concluded by the EU, on the 
basis of Article 24 TEU,84 has narrow scope and is limited to the hardcore elements of 
cooperation and assistance, focussing, as per Article 87(6) Rome Statute, on the 
provision of information or documents. The Agreement is not intended to supplant the 
relationship individu
 
r referrals, cannot rely on the United Nations (UN) Security Council 
peration. 
r the initiation of an investigation from such 
on and 
 on the 1st of May 2006. 
 
78 As Antonio Cassese, the first president of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), observed in his paper “On the Current Trends towards Criminal Prosecution and 
Punishment of Breaches of International Humanitarian Law” (1998) 9 European Journal of 
International Law 2 at p. 8, “[The] ICTY is very much like a giant without arms and legs – it needs 
artificial limbs to walk and work. And these artificial limbs are state authorities. If the cooperation of 
states is not forthcoming, they cannot fulfil their functions.”  This statement is even more relevant with 
regard to the ICC, which, except fo
for the monitoring of coo
79 Art. 86 Rome Statute. 
80 The Prosecutor may also request assistance fo
organisations in accordance with Article 15(2).  
81 This is also reiterated in Article 54(3)(c) Rome Statute. 
82 Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the European Union on cooperati
assistance, O.J. L 115/50, 28.4.2006. The Agreement entered into force
83 http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/human_rights/icc/index.htm.  
84 Council Decision 2006/313/CFSP of 10 April 2006 concerning the conclusion of the Agreement 
between the International Criminal Court and the European Union on cooperation and assistance, O.J. 
L 115/49, 28.4.2006. 
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that the Agreement does not cover cooperation with the Member States of the 
European Union.85  
 For the most part, the EU-ICC Agreement is very technical.86 This is 
appropriately so to ensure efficient execution of an ICC request. The approach taken 
replicates the general practice in international criminal justice institutions and other 
intergovernmental organisations, where the former makes a request and the latter 
proceeds with its execution.87 In addition, there is provision for regular exchange of 
information and documents.88 Those are EU documents containing EU classified 
information and not documents of the Member States.89 Moreover, in relation to 
classified information the Agreement provides a detailed account of the rules and 
procedures governing such surrender.90 Similar arrangements apply to cooperation 
between the EU and the Prosecutor.91 Information shall not take only documentary 
form but, in addition, testimony of staff of the European Union may be requested.92 
Other provisions of the Agreement include the obligation of the EU to waive the 
Privileges and Immunities of a person within the scope of the ICC, where appropriate, 
in order to allow the Court to exercise its jurisdiction,93 the conditions under which 
 the Privileges and Immunities of the 
                                                
the EU may offer gratis personnel,94 services and facilities to the ICC,95 and the EU’s 
assistance in training of judges, prosecutors, officials and counsel.96 
 The provisions of the EU-ICC Agreement are by and large uncontroversial. It 
should be noted however that the tenor of the Agreement is particularly deferential 
towards the EU. In particular, the legal obligations enshrined in the EU-ICC 
Agreement are subject to respect and with due regard to the EU Treaty and the 
relevant rules thereunder.97 Regarding privileges and immunities, despite the ICC 
Statute providing that the official capacity is irrelevant,98 at the same time, the 
privileges and immunities of EU officials and third party representatives accredited to 
the EU form part of primary Union law.99 This harbours potential for conflict. 
However, the issue should not be overestimated. In addition to the deferential framing 
of the EU’s obligations, these provisions have been carefully drafted to avoid such a 
legal impasse. For instance, the obligation to furnish information or documents under 
Article 11 EU-ICC Agreement is balanced by guarantees of the confidentiality of the 
information provided. Likewise, the Protocol on
 
 
ing Compelled to Answer Questions on Grounds 
, 27 May 2006. 
-ICC Agreement 
ropean 
d Article 12 Privileges and Immunities of the EU-ICC Agreement. 
.1967. 
85 See Recital 10 and also implicitly Articles 2(1) and 3(1) EU-ICC Agreement.  
86 It stipulates eg where correspondence will be addressed to. See Article 16 EU-ICC Agreement. 
87 Article 7(2) EU-ICC Agreement. But see for instance  Simić et al Decision denying request for 
assistance in securing documents and witnesses from the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
Trial Chamber,. 7 June 2000. See also Decision on Prosecution Appeal against Decision on Oral 
Application for Witness TF1-150 to Testify without Be
of Confidentiality, SCSL-04-16-AR73
88 Article 7(1) EU-ICC Agreement.  
89 Article 3(1) EU-ICC Agreement. 
90 Article 9 of and Annex to the EU
91 Article 11 EU-ICC Agreement. 
92 Article 10 EU-ICC Agreement. 
93 Article 12 EU-ICC Agreement. 
94 Article 13 EU-ICC Agreement. 
95 Article 14 EU-ICC Agreement. 
96 Article 15 EU-ICC Agreement. 
97 Article 10 Testimony of staff of the European Union, Article 11 Cooperation between the Eu
Union and the Prosecutor an
98 Article 27 Rome Statute. 
99 Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Communities, O.J., No. 167, 13.7
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European Communities permits the waiver of immunities when such waiver is not 
contrary to the interests of the Communities.100  
 Generally speaking, the situation would have been very different had the EU 
and the ICC taken advantage of the possibilities offered by Article 87(6) and included 
other forms of cooperation and assistance in the Agreement. An interesting example 
of such cooperation would include an EU freezing of assets order to implement a 
cooperation request under Article 93(1)(k) of the Rome Statute. The legal basis for the 
adoption of such orders remains a matter of controversy in EU law. While in terrorist 
cases, freezing of assets orders against terrorist organisations and individuals have 
been based on an a Common Position (Second Pillar) followed by an EC Regulation 
based on Articles 60, 301 and 308 EC Treaty (First Pillar),101 freezing of assets orders 
against Karadžić, Mladić and Gotovina in order to implement the mandate of the 
ICTY have been based on a Council Common Position without any subsequent First 
Pillar measure.102 The choice of the method for adoption of an ICC-related EU 
as in which there is scope for conflict, 
the existing good will, will hopefully lead to a practical coordination of activities, 
-making 
                                                
freezing of assets order, albeit controversial in itself, will determine issues of judicial 
protection and respect for fundamental rights and will be analysed below.  
 The current content of the EU-ICC Cooperation Agreement is not expected to 
raise many problems in its application and guarantees a functional relationship 
between the EU and the ICC. Even in the are
leaving no room for institutional antagonism. 
Member State Cooperation: The influence of Third Pillar measures  
 
 In recent years the EU has been particularly active in adopting measures in the 
field of Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (Third Pillar). Such 
measures may potentially influence Member State cooperation with the ICC. For the 
most part, these measures do not entail ICC-specific obligations. However, the 
establishment of the ICC as a horizontal consideration on the EU policy
agenda reveals that, when opportune, the EU has included reference to instruments 
that would assist Member States carry out a cooperation request by the ICC. 
 More specifically, significant work has been done in the field of extradition 
which culminated in the adoption of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW).103 The 
Framework Decision provides a long list of offences attracting the issue of a EAW 
and, for a first time in a Third Pillar instrument, this includes crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC.104 The Rome Statute distinguishes between surrender which 
covers the delivering of a person by a State to the Court and extradition which 
 
 
ndation v. Council and Commission and C-402/05 Yassin 
f the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
uropean arrest warrant and 
ber States, O.J. L 190/1, 18.7.2002. 
 EAW. 
100 Article 18 of the Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Communities. 
101 Cases T-306/01 Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and 
Commission [2005] ECR II-3533, at paragraph 170 and T-315/01 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council and 
Commission [2005] ECR II-3649, at paragraph 135. Currently under appeal as Cases C-415/05P Ahmed 
Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Fou
Abdullah Kadi v. Council and Commission. 
102 Council Common Position 2004/694/CFSP of 11 October 2004 on further measures in support of 
the effective implementation of the mandate o
Yugoslavia (ICTY), O.J. L 315/52, 14.10.2004. 
103 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the E
the surrender procedures between Mem
104 Article 2(2), thirtieth indent
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involves the delivering of a person by one State to another.105 Consequently, the EAW 
does not directly facilitate the EU’s cooperation with the Court. However, the 
application of the EAW to aid an ICC-related cooperation request cannot be 
 identical to the EAW also includes crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
C.110
is permissive of such eventuality. In particular, 
forthcoming. As is also apparent in the Council Decision on investigation and 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, such expansive interpretation 
should be excluded.114 After all, the Council Decision clearly limits itself to acts by 
precluded. In fact, the EAW offers the tools to the EU Member States to fully 
cooperate with the ICC.106 Along the same lines, a related legal instrument of 
potentially great significance is the proposed European Evidence Warrant.107  
 Another instrument which the EU adopted under the Third Pillar is a 
Framework Decision on the execution in the European Union of orders freezing 
property or evidence.108 The purpose of this Framework Decision is to establish the 
rules under which a Member State will recognise and execute in its territory a freezing 
order issued by a judicial authority of another Member State.109 The list of offences 
which is
IC  This would facilitate Member States in the execution of  a request for the 
freezing of assets of a person indicted by the ICC under Article 93(1)(k) of the Rome 
Statute. 
 Having a look at the broader picture, Police and Judicial Cooperation in 
Criminal Matters in the European Union is implemented primarily through the 
European Police Office (Europol) and the European Judicial Cooperation Unit 
(Eurojust).111 Despite the substantive focus of the Third Pillar on organised crime, 
legal instruments adopted thereunder have included the investigation and prosecution 
of crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the ICC. Does this entail a role for Europol 
and Eurojust at the implementation of the Rome Statute? At the outset, it must be 
pointed out that the ICC context 
Article 87(1)(b) Rome Statute provides that requests for cooperation may be 
channelled either through the International Criminal Police Organization or any 
appropriate regional organization.  
 Reality however, is daunting. There is no specific role for Europol and it 
should be assumed that it is excluded from enforcing ICC obligations in the EU.112 
Although it may be argued in theory that the expansion of the list of offences which 
fall within the competence of Europol is possible,113 no such initiative has been 
                                                 
 
105 Article 102 Rome Statute. 
106 Luisa Vierucci, “The European Arrest Warrant: An Additional Tool for Prosecuting ICC Crimes” 
(2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 275 at p. 277. 
s in criminal matters, Brussels, 
ly 2003 on the execution in the European 
 property or evidence, O.J. L 196/45, 2.8.2003. 
 2003 drawing up, on the basis of Article 43(1) of the Convention on 
tes shall assist one another in 
107 COM(2003) 688 final, Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the European Evidence 
Warrant for obtaining objects, documents and data for use in proceeding
14.11.2003. 
108 Council Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA of 22 Ju
Union of orders freezing
109 Article 1 of the Framework Decision. 
110 Article 3, thirtieth indent of the Framework Decision. 
111 Articles 29-32 TEU. 
112 Council Act of 27 November
the Establishment of a European Police Office (Europol Convention), a Protocol amending that 
Convention, O.J. C 2/1, 6.1.2004. 
113 Peers, supra note 3 at p. 537. 
114 Council Decision 2003/335/JHA of 8 May 2003 on the investigation and prosecution of genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes, O.J. L 118/12, 14.5.2003. The narrow window allowed by 
Article 3 of the Council Decision which states that “Member Sta
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national enforcement authorities and that in the context of immigration applications.115 
 Similar considerations apply to Eurojust. However, the possibility of involving 
Eurojust in future cooperation requests should not be excluded and the signs are 
already there. For instance, on 10 April 2007 the OTP and Eurojust signed a Letter of 
Understanding.116 The Letter promulgates their agreement to enhance contacts 
between them, to explore areas of co-operation and to exchange experiences of a non-
operational nature. More specifically, the agreement aims to promote the sharing of 
general and specific information about serious and organised crime that may be of 
mutual interest and benefit. Finally, the Letter of Understanding also expresses the 
intent to explore forging a formal cooperation agreement in the future. Eurojust could 
prove to be crucial to the OTP’s mandate. Eurojust’s remit and experience in dealing 
with serious cross-border crime might prove to be key in the arrest and surrender of 
individuals sought by the Prosecutor for trial before the ICC. Yet, both Eurojust and 
Europol mandates should be stretched to enable them to prosecute and investigate 
crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the ICC.117  
 Given the breadth of the EU activities in the Justice and Home Affairs area of 
Union competence, a certain degree of effect on ICC matters is to be expected. 
Although such Third Pillar measures are not directly linked to the EU’s direct ICC 
initiatives, they may assist in increasing the level of assistance provided to the Court. 
Perhaps greater coordination and closer monitoring of such Third Pillar developments 
is required so as to have a more complete picture of the Union’s action on ICC-related 
matters. This in turn, would ensure the coherent and consistent furtherance of the 
activities of the Union in the above area with regard to the ICC. 
Investigation and Prosecution: ICC-specific EU measures 
 
 The ICC co-exists with national courts and is not intended to replace or 
displace them. Its complementary nature118 means that States get the opportunity to 
                                                                                                                                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 “relevant 
on. 
releases/2007/10-04-2007.htm
investigating and prosecuting the crimes referred to in Article 1 in accordance with relevant 
international agreements and national law” should not be overestimated. It is assumed that
international agreements” do not encompass the Europol Conventi
115 Articles 2 & 3 of Council Decision 2003/335/JHA of 8 May 2003 on the investigation and 
prosecution of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, O.J. L 118/12, 14.5.2003. 
116 http://eurojust.europa.eu/press_  
ts of 
ure and Evidence, (Transnational Publishers, Ardsley, New York, 2001), 
117 Cedric Ryngaert, “Universal Jurisdiction in an ICC Era: A Role to Play for EU Member States with 
the Support of the European Union” (2006) 14 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and 
Criminal Justice 46 at pp. 72-76. 
118 See, tenth preambular paragraph, Articles 1 and 17 Rome Statute. On complementarity, see 
generally John T Holmes, “Complementarity: National Courts versus the ICC” in Antonio Cassese, 
Paolo Gaeta and John RDW Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A 
Commentary, (vol I, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002), pp. 667-686; John T Holmes, 
“Jurisdiction and Admissibility” in Roy S Lee (ed), The International Criminal Court, Elemen
Crimes and Rules of Proced
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investigate and prosecute first the crimes set out in Article 5 of the Rome Statute, 
namely, genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. It also ensures that the 
ICC will only intervene if a State is “unwilling or unable genuinely” to deal with a 
case.119 In such an instance, the ICC will take over from national courts and the case 
d in the 
ome 
will be tried in the Hague.  
 Although not an obligation under the ICC regime, it is advisable for a State to 
incorporate the ICC crimes into domestic law, as well as to review the defences and 
other general principles of international criminal law to determine their compatibility 
with the ICC regime. Enabling national prosecution of the crimes containe
R Statute constitutes the first step in evading the ICC’s jurisdiction.120 As 
mentioned above, several Member States have adopted legislation in this respect.  
 Whether the political will exists to adopt ICC implementing legislation on an 
EU level could be a matter of debate. The competence of the EU in relation to 
approximation of substantive criminal laws of the Member States is extremely 
limited, focusing mainly on organised crime, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking,121 
that is areas classed as transnational rather than international criminal law.122  
 When it comes to investigation and prosecution though, the EU has adopted 
measures under the Third Pillar with a specific focus on the ICC. First, a Decision 
setting up a European network of contact points in respect of persons responsible for 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes has been adopted.123 This Decision 
should be perceived as a limited ex ante implementation of the national Focal Points 
promulgated in the Action Plan and its objective is to facilitate the collection and 
                                                                                                                                            
 
 
tional and International Criminal Law in 
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pp. 321-348; Mireille Delmas-Marty, “Interactions between Na
the Preliminary Phase of Trial at the ICC” (2006) 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice 2. 
119Article 17 Rome Statute. 
120 As the ICC’s Prosecutor said, upon taking up his position in June 2003: “the absence of trials before 
… [the ICC], as a consequence of the regular functioning of national institutions, would be a major 
success.” Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court “Statement made 
at the ceremony for the solemn undertaking of the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC” (Ceremony for the 
solemn undertaking of the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, The Hague, 16 June 
2003) available 
cpi.int/library/organs/otp/030616_moreno_ocampo_english_final.pdf. 
121 Articles 29 and 31(e) TEU. Peers, supra note 3, Chapter 8. 
122 According to Mueller, “transnational crime” has been invented “in order to identify certain criminal 
ting transnational crime: concepts, 
u has been advocated by Boister. See Neil Boister, “Transnational Criminal Law?” (2003) 
-975. 
ing up a European network of contact points in 
phenomena transcending international borders, transgressing the laws of several states or having an 
impact on another country”. See Gerhard O.W. Mueller, “Transnational Crime: Definitions and 
Concepts” in Phil Williams and Dimitri Vlassis (eds), Comba
activities, and responses, (London, Frank Cass, 2001). The distinction between transnational criminal 
law which covers norms established by the suppression conventions and international criminal law 
stricto sens
14 European Journal of International Law 953 at 974
123 Council Decision 2002/494/JHA of 13 June 2002 sett
respect of persons responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, O.J. L 167/1, 
26.6.2002.  
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exchange of information between national contact points.124 Second, a Decision on 
investigation and prosecution.125 This is a very important Decision whose aim is to 
increase cooperation between national units and maximise the ability of law 
enforcement authorities to cooperate effectively in the field of investigation and 
 genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.126 Law 
enforcement authorities must be given information over suspects of crimes within the 
vision undoubtedly flags the issue of 
ersonal data protection.128 To this end, the Decision provides that all such exchange 
Third has been partly addressed by the TEU131 and partly left in obscurity.132 Judicial 
constitution-making in the Third Pillar has been heralded by the Court’s 
                                                
prosecution of
jurisdiction of the ICC. Such information may be obtained from immigration 
authorities of another Member State.127 This pro
p
of information shall take place in full compliance with applicable international and 
domestic data protection legislation.129 However, it must be noted that this provision 
appears to hand national law enforcement authorities unlimited rights over personal 
data following a well-established trend in the EU.130 
  
Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? Judicial control and human rights protection 
in the European Union in the Third Pillar 
 
 It has been illustrated that the EU has adopted a series of measures under the 
Third Pillar directly or indirectly related to the ICC which may adversely affect the 
fundamental rights of individuals in the EU’s area of freedom, security and justice. 
The analysis of the issues forms part of the EU constitutional discourse over the 
nature and qualities of measures taken under the Third Pillar. Whether the well-
established principles of Community law under the First Pillar can be extended to the 
 
 
124 Article 2 of the European network of contact points decision. The national Focal Points’ mandate is 
broader as it provides for exchange of information with the EU Focal Point and NGOs in additional to 
other national Focal Points. See Section A.3(ii) of the Action Plan. 
125 Council Decision 2003/355/JHA on the investigation and prosecution of genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes, O.J. L 118/12, 14.5.2003. Hereafter, the ‘Investigation and Prosecution 
Decision’. 
126 Article 1 Investigation and Prosecution Decision. 
127 Article 3(2) Investigation and Prosecution Decision. 
es: “One must bear in mind that the VIS is an information system developed 
128 See, in relation to terrorism, Opinion of the European Date Protection Supervisor on the Proposal 
for a Council Decision concerning access for consultation of the Visa Information System (VIS) by the 
authorities of Member States responsible for internal security and by Europol for the purposes of 
prevention, detection and investigation of terrorist offences and other serious criminal offences 
(COM(2005) 600 final), O.J. C 97/6, 25.4.2006. In Section 1.2.a) of the Opinion the European Data 
Protection Supervisor stat
in view of the application of the European visa policy and not as a law enforcement tool.” (Underlining 
on and Prosecution Decision. 
il direct effect”. For 
ar from Maastricht to the European 
Aspects” (2004) 41 Common Market Law Review 609. 
appears in the original). 
129 Article 6 Investigati
130 See, The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union, 
O.J. C 53/1, 3.3.2005. 
131 For instance, Article 34(2)(b) establishes Framework Decisions as instruments of the Third Pillar. 
The function of Framework Decisions echoes the First Pillar Directives. In order to establish the 
distinction the Treaty itself provides that Framework Decisions “shall not enta
more, see Bartolomiej Kurcz and Adam Lazowski, “Two Sides of the Same Coin? Framework 
Decisions and Directives Compared” (2006) 25 Yearbook of European Law 177. 
132 Pieter Jan Kuijper, “The Evolution of the Third Pill
Constitution: Institutional 
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groundbreaking judgment in Pupino in which the Court emphasised the obligation of 
national courts “to interpret national law in conformity with the Framework 
e classification and give a 
elimi
rulings on the validity and interpretation of framework decisions, interpretation of 
Decision”.133 Indirect effect marked the beginning of a series of analogies from 
Community law in order to contribute effectively to the pursuit of the Union’s 
objectives.134 Recently, the Court has been given the opportunity to confirm that 
respect for fundamental rights as general principles of Community law applies also to 
the Third Pillar. In particular, the Court held that “the institutions are subject to 
review of the conformity of their acts with the Treaties and the general principles of 
law, just like the Member States when they implement law of the Union.135  
 The review of Union acts is dependent on the Court of Justice’s jurisdiction 
under the Third Pillar. To start with, the ECJ’s jurisdiction is governed by Article 35 
TEU and is divided into preliminary rulings from national courts and direct challenges 
in the ECJ brought by a Member State or the Commission. The heads of jurisdiction 
are exhaustively listed in this Article136 and, accordingly, Third Pillar Common 
Positions are in principle excluded from the Court’s jurisdiction.137 Remarkably, by 
making a further analogy to well-established Community principles, the Court held 
that all measures adopted by the Council, whatever their nature or form, which are 
intended to have legal effects in relation to third parties, can be challenged.138 Hence, 
if the Court is faced with a Third Pillar Common Position which generates legal 
effects for third parties, it will accord the act its tru
pr nary ruling.139 In relation to the freezing of assets discussed above, were the 
EU to expand its cooperation with the Court and adopt an EU freezing order on the 
basis of a Second Pillar Common Position, following the ICTY model, would such 
order, after Segi, be reviewed by the Court of Justice?140 Although the Court’s 
judgment is framed in general terms “all measures adopted by the Council”,141 its 
application should be limited to Third Pillar matters as the jurisdiction of the Court 
under the Second Pillar is altogether excluded.142 
 Going onto the preliminary rulings jurisdiction of the Court, this includes 
                                                 
 
133 Case C-105/03 Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285 at paragraph 34. 
134 Ibid, at paragraph 36. 
135 Case C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v. Leden van de Ministerraad, judgment of 3 May 
2007, not yet reported, at paragraph 45. See also Case C-354/05P Gestoras Pro Amnistía et al. v. 
Council, judgment of 27 February 2007, not yet reported at paragraph 51 and Case C-355/04P Segi et. 
February 2007, not yet reported, at paragraph 51. On the application of 
 TEU. 
e. 
oras, op. cit. supra, at paragraph 53. The wording replicates 
usceptible to judicial review under the First Pillar, Case 22/70 
1] ECR 263, at paragraphs 38-42. See also Peers, supra note 
ragraph 54.  
al v. Council, judgment of 27 
human rights as general principles of Union law see, Eleanor Spaventa, “Opening Pandora’s Box: 
Some Reflections on the Constitutional Effects of the Judgment in Pupino” (2007) 1 European 
Constitutional Law Review 5 at p. 17. 
136 Article 35(1) and (6)
137 Measures adopted under the Second Pillar are also immune from the jurisdiction of the Court 
pursuant to Article 46 TEU. For instance, the foundations of the EU relations with the ICC, namely the 
Common Position and the Council Decision concluding the EU-ICC Agreement cannot be challenged 
in the Court of Justic
138 Segi op. cit. supra, at paragraph 53; Gest
the well-established rule regarding acts s
Commission v. Council (Re ERTA) [197
145 at pp. 898-902. 
139 Segi, op. cit. supra, at paragraph 53. 
140 Segi, op. cit. supra, at pa
141 Segi, op. cit. supra, at paragraph 53. 
142 Article 46 TEU. 
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conventions and validity and interpretation of the measures implementing them.143 
However, such jurisdiction is not compulsory. A Member State must make a 
as been 
precise, it answered the question which was 
declaration accepting the Court’s jurisdiction and specify which national courts (any 
court or tribunal or a court or tribunal of a Member State against whose decision there 
is no judicial remedy) shall have the right to make a reference.144 The latest available 
data indicate that only 14 Member States have made such a declaration.145 Out of 
those, in Spain and Hungary, only final instance courts may refer the case to the Court 
of Justice.146  
 There are some interesting considerations which access to the Court’s 
jurisdiction under the Third Pillar generates. It must be pointed out at the outset that 
all national courts have jurisdiction to review national measures implementing Union 
acts against their own constitutional rules even if they have not accepted the Court’s 
jurisdiction.147 In this respect, national courts have been recently faced with 
challenges against national legislation implementing the EAW.148 Obviously, when 
the implementing national measures depart from the Union act they implement, 
national courts can always review the manner in which State discretion h
exercised under both national constitutional rules and fundamental rights as general 
principles of Community law. When however the Union act has been implemented 
verbatim such review indirectly entails the review of the Union act by the national 
court and there are many legitimate reasons in Union law why a national court would 
refrain from doing this.149 This is a good example of a case in which the national court 
may want to make a reference for a preliminary ruling on validity from the Court. 
 What if there are no implementing national measures? The Segi judgment 
indirectly addresses the issue.150 The applicants in this case were included in a list of 
terrorists annexed to a Common Position adopted under both the Second and Third 
Pillars.151 Instead of requesting the review of the lawfulness of the Common Position, 
they applied for compensation for the harm suffered as a result of their inclusion to 
the list.152 Having been asked the wrong question the Court appears, at a first glance, 
to give the wrong answer or, to be more 
not asked, namely whether the lawfulness of Common Positions can be reviewed by 
the Court. As explained above, it held that they can if they create legal effects for 
                                                 
 
143 Segi, op. cit. supra, at paragraphs 44-46. 
144 Article 35(2)-(3) TEU. 
. 
lts in the non-
st Warrant. Also, Ilias Bantekas, “The Principle of Mutual Recognition in EU Criminal 
 to several 
tion 2001/931/CFSP of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific 
344/93, 28.12.2001 which is a mixed Second and Third Pillar 
aragraph 5. 
145 Eleanor Spaventa, “Remembrance of Principles Lost: On Fundamental Rights, the Third Pillar and 
the Scope of Union Law” (2006) 25 Yearbook of European Law 153 at p. 156
146 Steve Peers, “Salvation outside the Church: Judicial Protection in the third pillar after the Pupino 
and Segi Judgments” (2007) 44 Common Market Law Review 883 at p. 886.  
147 Spaventa, supra note 145 at pp. 170-171. However, if this national review resu
execution of the ICC cooperation request, it will be treated as a failure to cooperate on behalf of that 
State and the Article 87(5) and 112(f) Rome Statute procedure will come into place. 
148 Spaventa, ibid at pp. 158-159 comments on the repercussions of the German and Polish 
Constitutional Courts judgments on the unconstitutionality of national legislation implementing the 
European Arre
Law” (2007) 32 European Law Review 365 at pp. 376-377 who makes reference
jurisdictions. 
149 Spaventa, ibid at pp. 158-159 with reference to the German Constitutional Court case.  
150 Segi, op. cit. supra. 
151 Council Common Posi
measures to combat terrorism, O.J. L 
Common Position. 
152 Segi, op. cit. supra, at p
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third parties.153 However, such expansive interpretation of Article 35 did not extend its 
jurisdiction to entertain a claim in damages. The Court then, presumably in order to 
 high political importance, 
ust ensure that all Member States make the declaration accepting the Court’s 
ichever the way out of this deadlock, the Union’s position is, at present, 
ainst impunity in its human 
ing over its own ability to 
otect 
dismiss claims for lack of effective judicial protection,154 pointed towards the 
availability of national remedies. It held: 
“Finally, it is to be borne in mind that it is for the Member States and, in particular, their 
courts and tribunals, to interpret and apply national procedural rules governing the exercise of 
rights of action in a way that enables natural and legal persons to challenge before the courts 
the lawfulness of any decision or other national measure relating to the drawing up of an act 
of the European Union or its application to them and to seek the compensation for any loss 
suffered.”155  
Thereby, the Court directed the applicants towards national courts and encouraged 
them to challenge “national measures relating to the drawing up of an act”, for 
instance, a request by Spain for the inclusion of the applicants’ name in the Annex to 
the Common Position, “or to its application”, for instance, interrogation and arrest, 
“and to seek compensation for any loss suffered”. These are separate causes of action 
however, and the harmful impact of the Common Position per se is still not addressed. 
This is of course unless the Court implies that the applicant may sue the President of 
the Council of the European Union – the person having signed the Union act – in a 
national court for defamation. In all cases, if the incidental review of the lawfulness of 
the Union act becomes necessary to enable the national court to give judgment the 
national court would want to make a reference to the Court of Justice for a 
preliminary ruling on validity.156 If the national court is barred from doing so because 
the Member State at issue has not accepted the jurisdiction of the Court we are back to 
square one, and the question of availability of a remedy re-emerges.  
 From all examples mentioned above it appears that the question of effective 
judicial protection is inextricably linked to and dependent upon the national 
declaration accepting the Court’s jurisdiction under Article 35. Where such 
declaration is missing effective judicial protection is at stake157 unless, of course, 
national courts are willing to step in. Following this realisation, the reasoning of the 
Court in Segi becomes translucent. By emphasising the limitations of access – 
“subject   to the conditions fixed by Article 35” – and by subtly passing the torch of 
judicial review of Union acts to national courts, the Court is sending a resounding 
message to the Member States much more explicitly than before:158 unless Member 
ates want national courts interfering with decisions ofSt
they m
jurisdiction or take the even bolder step of amending the conditions of jurisdiction 
enshrined in Article 35 TEU in the ongoing constitutional reform.  
 Wh
paradoxical. On the one hand, it has integrated the fight ag
rights policy but, on the other, it has not been convinc
pr fundamental rights in the Third Pillar. 
  
                                                 
 
153 Ibid, at paragraph 54. 
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ouncil [2002] ECR I-6677 at paragraph 41. 
154 Ibid, at paragraph 57. 
155 Ibid, at paragraph 56. 
156 Case C-352/98P Laboratoires Pharmaceutiques
Commission [2000] ECR I-5291 at para
157 Spaventa, supra note 145 at p. 155. 
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The preservation of the universality and integrity of the Rome 
Statute 
Universality of the Rome Statute: An introvert look 
 
 Ratification of the Rome Statute and subsequent implementation are 
essentially a State matter. A look at the ratification charts, reveals that membership of 
the Court amongst EU Member States is almost universal.159 The Common Position 
was adopted before the 2004 enlargement. It provided in Recital 3 that all Member 
States had ratified the Rome Statute. The acceding Member States expressed their 
intention to apply the Common Position from the date of its adoption, almost a year 
ior topr  their formal accession to the Union.160 Nevertheless, not all acceding States 
ratified the Rome Statute in time for their accession and insofar as the Czech Republic 
is concerned, the Rome Statute has not been ratified to date.161 The issue has been 
given no attention in the Commission’s monitoring report.162 In fact, in contrast to the 
emphatic statement in the Common Position that all Member States have ratified the 
Rome Statute, the Action Plan a year later provides that they, where appropriate, will 
endeavour to put in place as soon as possible legislation necessary to implement the 
Rome Statute.163 Similarly, the Member States are encouraged to ratify the Agreement 
on Privileges and Immunities of the ICC.164  
 There are awkward repercussions from this which become immediately 
apparent. The EU Member State which has not ratified the Rome Statute and is not 
bound by it, finds itself bound by measures adopted to give effect to the Rome Statute 
and facilitate the achievement of its objectives.165 Despite the stated intention to 
engage the Czech Republic with the ICC pursuant the universality objective, the 
means at the EU’s disposal are limited. The Common Position constitutes a Second 
Pillar instrument and as such the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice is excluded.166 In 
this respect, there is no enforcement procedure similar to the one followed under 
Article 226 of the EC Treaty under the Second Pillar in order to secure compliance of 
l ratification of the Rome Statute, while at the same time it does not have 
e tools at its disposal to demand such conduct from a Member State. While this is 
not the first instance of double standards between EU internal and external 
the Member States with the Common Position. The EU is then found in a position in 
which, as will be seen below, it exerts pressure on third countries in order to achieve 
the universa
th
                                                 
 
159 See http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=romesignatures.  
160 Article 9(1) of the Common Position. It should be recalled here that the Accession Treaty was 
signed on 16 April 2003 and came into force on 1 May 2004. 
161 An event to convince Czech parliamentarians is planned f thor the 4  of October 2007. Although not 
ss for EU Membership of Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, 
Brussels, 5.11.2003.   
C. See also Section C.2(viii) of the 
officially backed by the EU, this event has had wholesome EU support. 
162 COM(2003)675 final, Comprehensive Monitoring Report of the European Commission on the state 
of preparedne
Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia, 
163 Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Criminal Court (APIC), ICC-
ASP/1/3. As of the 6th of July 2007, 50 States have ratified the API
Action Plan. 
164 Section C.2(x) of the Action Plan. 
165 Council Decision 2003/335/JHA of 8 May 2003 on the investigation and prosecution of genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes, O.J. L 118/12, 14.5.2003. 
166 Article 46 TEU. 
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d s,emand
his clause. Article 11(6) of the revised Cotonou 
m
Rome Statute and related instruments.”   
167 there is a qualitative difference in that the EU does not force the Czech 
Republic to accede to the ICC Statute, not because it does not want to, but because it 
cannot. 
Universality of the Rome Statute: An ICC Clause in Agreements with third 
countries 
 
 The aim of preserving the universality of the Rome Statute has led the EU to 
mainstream the ICC in its external relations and to bring it up as a human rights issue 
in the negotiations of agreements with third countries.168 Since t e h entry into force of 
the Rome Statute, the envisaged result of the negotiations will include an ICC Clause 
in the international agreement concluded.169 Before embarking on the analysis of these 
ICC clauses, it should be recalled that the European Union, acting primarily under its 
First Pillar competences has concluded agreements with most countries in the 
world.170 These agreements are negotiated by the European Commission on the basis 
of negotiating directives granted to it by the Council pursuant to Article 300 EC 
Treaty. All recent negotiating mandates included an ICC clause.171  
 Faithful to the commitments undertaken by the Common Position and 
elaborated in the Action Plan, the European Union has included an ICC clause in the 
multilateral agreement with the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. The 
recently revised Development Cooperation Agreement with the ACP countries 
(Cotonou Agreement) constitutes an important in coverage and political impact 
agreement.172 However, Article 11 which contains the ICC clause falls under the 
heading “element of the political environment” and not an “essential element” of the 
Agreement, which mitigates its efficacy as there is no possibility of suspending aid on 
the basis of lack of compliance with t
Agreement reads:  
“In promoting the strengthening of peace and international justice, the Parties reaffirm their 
determination to: 
- share experience in the adoption of legal adjustments required to allow for the ratification 
and implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; and 
- fight against international crime in accordance with international law, giving due regard to 
the Rome Statute. The Parties shall seek to take steps towards ratifying and i plementing the 
                                                 
 
167 The EU has been criticised repeatedly on this, in particular, in the context of the eastwards 
onality” (2005) 30 
 General Secretariat of the 
munity (Doc. 7913/1/07). 
n Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in 
/Pdf/negociation_20050407_en.pdf
enlargement. See Marise Cremona, “EU Enlargement: Solidarity and Conditi
European Law Review 3. See also, Andrew Williams, EU Human Rights: A Study in Irony, (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2004). 
168 Section B.3(iii) of the Action Plan. 
169 For an overview, see Doc. 04/07 Rev 1, 30 May 2007 issued by the
Council of the European Union.  
170 For a taxonomy of these agreements see Koutrakos, supra note 22, Chapter 10.  
171 Including negotiations with China (Doc. 14892/06), Russia (Doc. 15053/06), Ukraine (5062/07), 
Iraq (Doc. 6511/06), Central America (Doc. 7932/1/07) and the Andean Com
Similar detailed clauses have been proposed in pending negotiations with Indonesia, Singapore, 
Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Brunei Darussalam and South Africa. 
172 Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States 
of the one part, and the Europea
Cotonou on 23 June, O.J. L 317/3, 15.12.2000. An information note on the revisions is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/ICenter .  
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 In the chapeau of Article 11(6), emphasis is placed by the Parties to the 
Agreement on the strengthening of peace and justice. Ever since the creation of the ad 
 lead into the discussion 
sist States in finding the right approach that best fits their individual 
stem
 This latter provision is wider than trials at the ICC. 
hoc Tribunals the peace and justice debate has been central to international criminal 
law.173 Given that the ICC operates in situations where peace is likely to have been 
disturbed, the relationship between peace and justice is going to be of importance to 
the ICC as well, which is why this is also reflected in the ICC Statute.174  That the EU 
therefore mentions peace and justice in Article 11 is a suitable
of the two areas covered by this Article.  
 The first priority of Article 11(6) is ICC ratification and implementation of the 
Rome Statute. The two are accurately given equal importance. For, ratification and 
implementation are interconnected. This is recognised by the EU which for the first 
time positively encourages the sharing of States’ experiences in adjusting their legal 
systems in order to allow for ratification and implementation. 
 Experience sharing will help alleviate some of the burden smaller or less 
developed countries face when making the changes necessary nationally to ratify or 
implement the Statute. Putting the procedures in place and enabling a State to 
cooperate fully with the Court and to prosecute domestically, is not an easy task. 
However, all 105 State parties to the ICC will eventually go through this process. 
Inevitably, some patterns ought to develop and similar approaches will be formulated, 
which will as
sy . Article 11(6) Cotonou Agreement does not outline the exact mechanism to 
achieve this exchange of experience. The Court’s Legal Tools project, however, 
aspires to provide the answer to this question.175  Undertaking this commitment under 
the Cotonou agreement, is an important step in acknowledging that some legal 
adjustments are necessary, whilst rejecting their use as an excuse so as not to join the 
ICC regime. 
 Article 11(6) of the Cotonou Agreement further obligates State parties to it to 
“fight against international crime in accordance with international law, giving due 
regard to the Rome Statute”. 
Neither how States can fight international crime, nor what is meant by international 
crime is specified in this instance. Reference to international crime here does not 
cover terrorism or weapons of mass destruction which are specifically covered for in 
the Articles following on from Article 11. The wording of the Article does not 
preclude other international crimes from being considered, such as those covered by 
transnational criminal law.176  
 This fight against international crime, may take place either on the 
international plane but also nationally. Reference to the Rome Statute is not exclusive. 
The provision also makes reference to international law, thus accepting all available 
fora for the prosecution of international crimes such as international or 
internationalised tribunals as well as national courts.177 What is striking however, is 
                                                 
 
173 Paul R. Williams and Michael P. Scharf, Peace with Justice? War Crimes and Accountability in the 
former Yugoslavia, (Oxford, Rowman & Littlefield, 2002); Payam Akhavan, “Justice in the Hague, 
Peace in the Former Yugoslavia? A Commentary on the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal” (1998) 
20 Human Rights Quarterly 737. 
174 See Articles 13(b) and 16 ICC Statute. See also how the peace process in Uganda currently 
coincides with the ICC investigations. 
175 http://www.icc-cpi.int/legaltools/  
176 Article 29 TEU. 
177 These would include but will not be limited to the ICTY, the ICTR, the Sierra Leone Special Court, 
the Iraqi Special Tribunal, etc.. 
23 
 
 
 
that it makes fighting against international crime an obligation. Although the Rome 
Statute has as its aim the combat of impunity, States have discretion as to whether 
they join the ICC regime. Even when they do join, they are not obliged to initiate 
national investigations and prosecutions, but if they do not, they risk having cases 
nce to an obligation to prosecute nationally to 
it an obligation to fight against impunity, the Cotonou 
serted in 
tate  covered by the ENP178 to insert, 
ving the integrity of the Rome Statute.180  
the ICC Statute and is therefore very welcome.  
 The EU’s position regarding candidate States for membership has been even 
more demanding. The obligation of compliance with international criminal law and 
tion.  The example of Croatia 
taken over by the ICC. The only refere
be found in the Rome Statute is in its fourth and sixth preambular paragraphs which 
are not binding. By making 
Agreement goes a step further than the Statute. 
 Similarly to the Cotonou Agreement, ICC clauses have been in
relations with third countries on a case-by-case basis. In relation to the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), it should be noted that ICC clauses have not been 
inserted to the existing agreements – either Partnership and Cooperation Agreements 
or Euro-Mediterranean Agreements – but are included in the ENP Action Plans as 
political documents. These clauses require the S s
with some slight differentiation,179 a clause providing the following obligations: 
- to accede to the Rome Statute,  
- to make the necessary legislative and constitutional amendments for its 
implementation and  
- to fight against international crime in accordance with international law, 
having due regard to preser
At a first glance, this ICC clause appears to go further than the Cotonou one in that it 
requires the third States to proceed with the constitutional amendments necessary so 
as to enable implementation of the Rome Statute. This is a positive legal obligation 
aiming to eliminate obstacles likely to slow down implementation post accession to 
the cooperation with the ICTY seem to have paved the way for ICC ratification and 
implementation to be elevated to an accession condi 181
whose candidate status risked delay because of its perceived lack of cooperation with 
the ICTY is illustrative of this.182  
                                                 
 
178 Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, 
Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. 
riteria were laid 
y of 
Page.asp?id=872&lang=en&mode=g
179 For instance, the ENP Action Plan with Israel, a non-ICC party, which has also signed a bilateral 
agreement with the US, requires Israel to promote cooperation on issues such as fight against impunity 
of authors of genocide, war crimes and any other crime against humanity. The ENP Action Plan with 
Tunisia has only a general clause for the respect of fundamental rights, despite Tunisia not having 
signed the Rome Statute.  
180 Doc. 04/07 Rev 1, 30 May 2007 issued by the General Secretariat of the Council of the European 
Union. 
181 All countries wishing to join the EU must abide by the accession criteria or the Copenhagen criteria, 
on which the Commissions opinion on any application for accession is based. These c
down at the European Council meeting in Copenhagen in 1993 and added to at the European Council 
meeting in Madrid in 1995. They include political criteria (stability of the institutions safeguarding 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities), economic 
criteria (existence of a viable market economy, the ability to respond to the pressure of competition and 
market forces within the EU) and the ability to assume the obligations of a Member State stemming 
from the law and policies of the EU. The firm establishment of the ICC in the human rights polic
the EU elevates compliance with the ICC to a political criterion for EU membership.  
182 The Council gave its agreement for accession negotiations with Croatia to begin on the basis of a 
positive assessment of Croatia’s cooperation with the ICTY. See, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/show .  The full cooperation with 
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 In sum, exerting pressure by diplomatic means is an important means of 
rallying support for the ICC. Carrot and stick techniques have also been used in 
relation to the ICTY with varying degrees of success.183 While the European Union 
 clause in 
s relations with third countries, it is poised to develop a novel human rights 
reclude States from 
may not offer the carrot of accession to most States, by integrating an ICC
it
conditionality which may yield good results. 
Integrity of the Rome Statute: Meeting the United States’ challenge 
 
 Whilst the US is not the only State to oppose the ICC,184 soon after the 
conclusion of the Rome Statute, the US administration began its campaign to 
undermine the Court. A lot of ink has been spilled in analysing the US actions, with 
the main emphasis being on the most potent of those, the Bilateral Immunity 
Agreements (BIAs).185 The purpose of these agreements is to p
surrendering any persons sought by the ICC. Although the legality of BIAs and their 
impact on the Court have been the subject of much academic discussion,186 the EU’s 
response remains largely unexplored. Clearly, such actions run counter to the stated 
policy of the EU in support of the integrity of the Rome Statute.  
 In September 2002, the General Affairs and External Relations Council 
adopted its conclusions on the International Criminal Court.187  The conclusions serve 
multiple aims. First, they reaffirm the EU’s commitment to and support of the ICC, by 
referring to and summarising the aims of the Common Position. Second, they provide 
a common European front on the US objections, which are succinctly mentioned and 
subtly disposed of in the second paragraph of the Conclusions. In the same paragraph, 
confidence in the apolitical nature of the Court and in its complementarity regime is 
expressed. Third, due emphasis is placed on the importance of re-engaging the US in 
the international criminal law debate. However, no concrete measures are suggested 
as to how to achieve this. In fact, despite the stated intention of the EU to engage the 
                                                                                                                                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the is posited as a short term priory in the Accession Partnership with Croatia. See Council Decision 
2006/145/EC of 20 February 2006 on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the 
Accession Partnership with Croatia and repealing Decision 2004/648/EC, O.J. L 55/30, 25.2.2006. 
 negative 
n
 the ICC” (2005) 3 Journal of 
BIAs see: http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=usaicc
183 However, finding the right balance will always be a problem. From the deplorable pledging of aid 
by the US for the surrender of Slobodan Milošević to the “innocent” call by Cassese to ban former 
Yugoslavia from the Atlanta Olympics in 1996 (See ICTY Press Release CC/PIO/088-E, 13 June 
1996), there has to be a middle way.  
184 China and India have also not signed up to the Court and have maintained a somewhat
position. See Lu Jianping and Wang Zhixiang, “Chi a’s Attitude towards the ICC” (2005) 3 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 608; Usha Ramanathan, “India and
International Criminal Justice 627. 
185 For a compilation of resources on the US   
ds QC and Ralph Wilde on 
.pdf
186 See Opinion by James Crawford SC, Philippe San
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/SandsCrawfordBIA14June03   
187 See General Affairs and External Relations, 2450th Council session – External Relations – Brussels, 
30 September 2002, 12134/02 (Presse 279). 
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United States with the ICC,188 the topic has been absent from the agenda of all EU-US 
Summits to date.189 The above conclusions are politically important as they bring the 
discussion to the State level and enhance a uniform approach. They confirm the EU 
position and implicitly reject the US efforts to thwart the Court’s ambit. In terms of 
legal effect, the conclusions do not contain any hard clauses for the Member States 
s up to the ICC regime. Due respect is therefore paid on existing 
international agreements to be considered. Although this is not further specified, other 
extradition agreements would conform to the typology of such international 
agreements. 
 The Guiding Principles acknowledge that despite the clear EU position, some 
States may still sign up to US BIAs. A number of safety clauses are contained in the 
Guiding Principles for this eventuality. States are encouraged to aim for a guarantee 
that ICC crimes will be investigated and, provided that evidence is available, they will 
                                                
and are of a declaratory nature.  
 Annexed to the above conclusions are a set of Guiding Principles. These 
specifically target US non-surrender agreements and set out the EU response. 
Interestingly, the Guiding Principles do not distinguish between EU Member States 
and third countries. Obviously, having masterminded the wording of the Guiding 
Principles the Member States have expressed their intention to be bound by them. 
However, these also constitute a foreign policy statement addressed to all countries, in 
particular the acceding States, the candidate States and the associated States.190 In 
relation to the candidate States it also amounts to an accession condition.191 It 
becomes clear thereby that the respect of the integrity of the ICC constitutes a 
fundamental element of the Union’s foreign policy. More importantly, they contain 
useful guidelines for States, which although non-binding, are capable of being 
influential on State policy. 
 The Guiding Principles recapitulate the cooperation obligations of a State 
when it sign
Agreements concluded under Article 98 Rome Statute, such as existing Status of 
Forces Agreements.192 The EU Guiding Principles do not advocate forgoing of such 
agreements. This position is in line with the spirit of the Rome Statute provision. The 
main focus of the Guiding Principles is on the US BIAs concluded specifically after 
the entry into force of the ICC Statute. Such agreements, when concluded with ICC 
members, would be inconsistent with their pre-existing obligations under the Statute. 
The Guiding Principles echo this approach. Moreover, they go a step further when 
they maintain that such agreements “may [also] be inconsistent with other 
international agreements to which ICC States Parties are Parties”. The lack of explicit 
reference to other such international agreements allows potentially other types of 
 
 
188 General Affairs Council Conclusions, 30 September 2002  
189 http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/us/intro/summit.htm  
190 The policy of associating the acceding and candidate states with the Presidency Declarations on the 
International Criminal Court has been uninterrupted. The list of documents on the EU-ICC relations is 
available at 
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be prosecuted. A second requirement is that such agreements should only cover 
nationals of non-ICC parties. This principle stems from the fact that the Rome Statute, 
being an international treaty, is only opposable to States that are parties to it, and not 
third States.193 Although the ICC would most commonly deal with nationals of State 
parties, it is foreseeable that crimes may be committed by third country nationals 
present on the territory of a State party to the ICC. In such a case, the ICC potentially 
has jurisdiction, based on the territoriality principle enshrined in Article 12 ICC 
Statute.194 The EU Guiding Principles are prepared to tolerate extradition of such an 
individual to the US, rather than the Court. The ICC operates on the basis of the 
complementarity principle anyway, which gives an opportunity to any State willing 
and able to exercise jurisdiction to do so.195 This would not necessarily frustrate 
 eye to some of the 
nciples contain a number of fallback positions. From the 
absolute rejection of BIAs to their being tolerated subject to some strictly defined 
hilst the EU clearly opposes such 
greements, its position as reflected in the Guidelines provides a workable solution for 
ates 
he EU has actively participated in the Court’s 
their members and depending on their agendas, pushed for the inclusion or exclusion 
                                                
Article 12 Rome Statute on the preconditions for the exercise of jurisdiction, provided 
that the US will exercise this right and investigate, with the view to prosecuting, if 
appropriate. However, if the US were unwilling or unable to investigate and 
prosecute, and extradition of the individual were to take place to that State, the EU 
Guiding Principles would essentially encourage turning a blind
most serious of crimes committed, which would consequently go unpunished.  
 Of considerable importance is the requirement established in the Guiding 
Principles for a sunset clause. The EU’s approach on the issue acknowledges that if, 
despite the strong encouragement not to, States enter into US agreements, they should 
do so temporarily. It is hoped that the adopted solution would not encourage the 
renewal of such agreements beyond the set date of their lapsing. 
 The Guiding Pri
conditions, they provide a flexible approach. W
a
St unable to resist US pressure. Working within this practical reality, and given 
that the guidelines do not have any great legal bearing, the approach chosen could not 
have been any different. 
Member State coordination in the ASP 
 
 The issue of Member State coordination in the Assembly of State Parties 
(ASP) is one which concerns both the effectiveness of the Union in the ICC and the 
EU esoteric constitutional questions. T
creation and still represents its Member States in the ASP. From an ICC perspective, 
such participation is not uncommon. It is a well-known fact that a number of groups 
had been formed in the run-up to the Conference, which represented the interests of 
 
e Law of Treaties, 1155 United Nations Treaty 
nd Third States” (2000) 
 
193 Article 34 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on th
Series 331. See also Dapo Akande, “The Basis of and Limits to the Jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court over Nationals of Non-Parties” (2003), 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice, 
618; Gennady M. Danilenko, “The Statute of the International Criminal Court a
21 Michigan Journal of International Law 445.  
194 Sharon A. Williams, “The Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court: From 1947-2000 and 
Beyond” (2000) 38 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 297. 
195 Since Article 18(1) Rome Statute, which deals with preliminary rulings, stipulates that all States, 
regardless of whether they are parties to the Statute or not, have to be notified of the beginning of an 
investigation, the same should be accepted for Article 17(1)(a) and (b) as well. 
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of various Statute provisions.196 From an ICC perspective, representation in the 
plenary sessions of the ASP is unique. 
 The question of coordination of the EU and its Member States in international 
fora has been central to the development of the Union as an international actor197 and 
has attracted the attention of several commentators.198 Member States must coordinate 
their position and uphold the common positions in international fora.199 This general 
duty is exercised predominantly by the Presidency when matters fall within the 
CFSP.200 The Presidency is assisted by the High-Representative for the CFSP and the 
incoming Presidency, while the Commission shall be fully associated in those tasks.201  
 In addition to the Treaty provisions, the Action Plan addresses the issue but 
only briefly.202 It restates the general principle that Member States should coordinate 
in all relevant multilateral fora as appropriate, and in accordance with established 
s been a resounding success. During the Rome Conference, 
procedures.203 It is clear from the Action Plan that the scope of this obligation exceeds 
the ASP and covers fora which are dealing with ICC-related matters and in which the 
EU participates. Member States are not only required to coordinate but also to 
actively contribute to the negotiations taking place in the Special Working Group 
established by the ASP to deal with the crime of aggression.204 
 In practice, unlike other fora, for instance the United Nations,205 the EU 
participation in the ICC ha
the State holding the EU Presidency took the floor on behalf of all the Member States 
on numerous occasions to address the Conference and express the Union’s position. 
This common voice has continued in the ASP before which successive Presidencies 
and occasionally the High Representative for the CFSP have made statements 
representing the Union.206 
 This rosy picture of Member State unity is tainted by the fact that, as 
mentioned above, the Czech Republic is not a party to the ICC. Naturally, the 
question arises: What will happen when the turn of Czech Republic comes to hold the 
rotating EU Presidency? From an ICC perspective, this should not cause too much of 
a problem since the Czech Republic is a signatory of the Statute, it is entitled to 
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e 27(3)(c) of the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the 
eral Assembly” in 
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observer status in the Assemb
ssembly.207 From an EU perspective,
ly of States Parties and may be allowed to address the 
 apart from the enormous embarrassment, there 
andling of more cases, States and the EU will have to find their place in the 
mergi
evelopment.  This two-pronged relationship with 
ed the US offensive on the ICC 
A
is no legal reason why the Czech Republic may not coordinate and represent the 27 
Member States of the Union. It has been common in practice however, when the 
Member State holding the Presidency is not a Member of the international 
organisation at issue for the next Presidency to represent the Union instead. This is 
likely to be the case with the ASP as well.208  
  
Concluding Remarks 
 
 Whilst the jury is still out as to the actual impact the ICC as a mechanism of 
international criminal justice will have on ending impunity and restoring the rule of 
law, the Court’s success as the main adjudicative body at the international level, lies 
not only on its efficient operation, but also on its successful interaction with national 
and supranational legal orders.209 As the Court gains in experience through a fair and 
efficient h
e ng international criminal justice system. Whereas the burden is likely to be 
more on the individual Member States, which will be required to execute a wide range 
of cooperation requests and take upon themselves the task of conducting 
investigations and prosecutions at the national level, the Union as a whole, will 
continue to play an important role both in positively encouraging its constituting 
members to be “good international citizens”, but also independently, and in its own 
name, in supporting the Court’s d 210
the Court best reflects the internal and external functions of the EU in ICC-related 
matters.  
 An active Union can be an asset to the Court, particularly when concerted EU 
activities assist in furthering the Court’s mission to end impunity for the most heinous 
international crimes. Not only has the EU provided the ICC with a firm commitment 
on institutional cooperation and has heralded support through a number of initiatives 
internally, but, most importantly, has counterbalanc
through the means of ICC clauses in international agreements, an akin but much 
milder version of anti-US BIAs.  
 The EU’s approach towards the Court has, to date, been distinctly pro-ICC. 
This does not preclude EU action running counter to the ICC in the future, or simply 
not being fully compatible with the Court. In the current state of affairs in EU 
integration, however, the possibilities of such conflicts seem practically limited. The 
real challenge will be for the EU to develop its ICC-related approach without being 
hampered by its constitutional imperfections, and for the ICC to continue to rip the 
benefits of a pro-ICC European Union in the future. 
 The relationship between the ICC and the EU has so far been ad hoc. Besides 
the functional aspects of the EU-ICC Cooperation Agreement, the rest of the EU 
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s, the EU seems to act beyond its remit from an EU constitutional 
pective. However, this seems to be acceptable by the individual Member States 
which have, in most part, followed the approach taken by the Union. All EU 
initiatives have so far been one-sided on behalf of the Union. The ICC has not taken 
any action to accommodate potential Union needs, nor should it have to. However, it 
has benefited from the hands-on support provided freely by the EU. Although most of 
the measures adopted so far contain at best the Union’s aspirations towards the Court, 
rather than any concrete measures, they reveal a strong connection between the EU 
and the ICC. This connection has to be cherished as a success in effective 
multilateralism benefiting both the EU activities in areas of considerable importance 
for its moral and political standing, but also the ICC which finds in the EU an 
invaluable partner.  
     
initiatives have been undertaken without any formal coordination between the EU and 
the Court. This atypical interaction which aims at the promotion of the ICC cause 
within the remit of the Union is loaded with a great political charge and is fully 
compatible with the EU’s human rights and democratic governance agenda. Given 
that one fourth of the Court’s membership is made up by EU Member States, the EU 
is the single largest block of States within the ICC constitution. This fact alone and 
the possibility of an expansion of the Union, renders the EU-ICC relationship unique. 
 In many way
pers
